

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.219

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 July 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. OSMAN

(United Arab Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA
Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU
Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Italy:

Mr. A. FANFANI
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. A. MELLER-CONRAD

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV

Mr. V.N. BENDRYSHEV

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. P.W.J. BUXTON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. W.A. HAYNE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the two hundred and nineteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset it is a pleasure for the Chair to welcome amongst us today His Excellency Amintore Fanfani, the Foreign Minister of Italy.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): May I first, on behalf of the delegation of the United Kingdom, say how pleased we are to meet in this Committee once more with old and new friends?

It is a measure of the long interruption in the Committee's work that this should be my first appearance at this table, although the Government I represent has now been in office for nine months. We all know that this interruption has had many causes. Its ill effects have been offset to some degree by this summer's session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York. But it seemed to me quite clear that the feeling of most of those who took part in that session was that the general exchange of views we were able to have in New York could never take the place of the detailed and expert negotiation for which this Committee has become over the years so well suited and qualified.

The debates in the Commission reflected too the need for a new and more urgent approach, both to the problem of general disarmament and to the steps needed to make the lives of all of us less perilous while we move painfully towards a disarmed world. This was very clearly expressed in the resolution (DC/225; ENDC/149) overwhelmingly adopted in the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965, and this sense of danger and of urgency is fully shared by my Government. In the negotiations now beginning again in Geneva I and my delegation are anxious to play a full part in attacking our problems on as wide a front as possible. If we all bend our efforts in this direction there seems to us to be no reason why we should not be able to report some real progress to the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

From what I have said it will be clear that, in the view of the United Kingdom, there is no need to wait for a world conference before getting to grips with these most important issues. That does not mean that we are against the idea of a world conference

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on disarmament if properly prepared. The United Kingdom voted for the resolution (DC/224; ibid.) adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 11 June because we sympathized with its spirit even though we had some reservations about its wording.

We agree that progress on disarmament will not be easy so long as a Power of the consequence of the Chinese People's Republic is left out of our councils. It is therefore clear that our reservations were not on that point. We did feel, however, that the wording of the resolution failed to bring out just how complicated the organization of a fruitful and effective world conference could well be. There are problems of representation that are a good deal less clear cut than that of China. There are the problems of the agenda and the machinery for organizing the conference. Those will, we think, need close study before a decision to call a world conference can usefully be taken.

In the meantime there is much for this Committee to do; and indeed it has been given a clear and compelling mandate to do it in resolution DC/225. We voted in New York for this resolution because Her Majesty's Government fully agrees with its first aim, which was to bring about an early resumption of detailed and expert negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on general and complete disarmament and collateral measures, and with its second and equally important aim, which was that priority should be given to securing a comprehensive nuclear test ban and an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

I spent yesterday back in London, and while there had occasion to report to my Prime Minister on the progress we had so far made. He gave me a message which he asked me to deliver to this Committee and which, with the Chairman's permission, I will read:

"Great problems and great opportunities face this meeting of the Disarmament Committee, which now reassembles for the first time since last September. The delegations now assembled at Geneva may justly feel proud that their expert knowledge and competence to handle complicated disarmament issues was recognized by the great majority of States in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

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"There is now, as the Disarmament Commission recognized, a wide measure of understanding of the dangers that would threaten us if the number of States possessing nuclear weapons is allowed to grow unchecked. The British Government believe therefore that the negotiation of a non-dissemination treaty is the most urgent problem facing us in the disarmament field. The British Government's approach is not based on any attempt to preserve exclusive nuclear privileges for a small group, but proceeds from recognition of the serious consequences that would follow if nuclear weapons were to pass into the hands of more and more States, with all the dangers that this would bring of nuclear war by mistake, miscalculation, accident or madness. It is the British Government's hope that a draft treaty will be put forward at an early meeting of this Committee, and that it will be given the most urgent and sympathetic consideration.

"It remains as important as ever to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I hope also to see progress made towards the adoption of President Johnson's imaginative and far-seeing proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. (ENDC/120). The British Government believe it urgent to consider the limitation and, if possible, the reduction of existing nuclear armouries, without destroying or upsetting the present overall military balance.

"The Disarmament Committee can make a priceless contribution to creating a better and safer world. I wish it all success, and pledge the full support of the British delegation in all your deliberations."

General and complete disarmament continues to be our aim and we must work untiringly towards it. We must not allow wars and rumours of wars to deflect us from this path. We know that to achieve a disarmament treaty will not be easy, that the road to disarmament is long and hard. The problems are real, and will be solved only by patient and often frustrating labour. It is not enough to be emotionally committed to the cause of peace and the rule of law. Those of us who believe in it must be ready to exhaust ourselves in its pursuit.

It is becoming more and more urgent that we make a start along that road; that we begin to reverse the arms race. We in the United Kingdom believe that even now the order and stability of the world could be assured with nuclear weapons reduced to lower, safer and less costly levels without destroying or upsetting the present overall

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military balance. We believe, to put it more plainly, that much of the great nuclear armoury that has been built up in the East and the West could be destroyed without putting at risk the safety or the peace of mind of either side. That belief is based not upon faith or hope, but upon close and extensive studies upon which we in Britain have been engaged during the past months.

Meanwhile, I think the Committee will agree that one of the most important effects of the recent meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission was to underline the world-wide concern to prevent without delay the spread of nuclear weapons. That was made clear, I think, in the message from my Prime Minister which I have just read.

No one will seriously deny that that is the most urgent question facing the world today, and I noted with pleasure that President Johnson put that first amongst the objectives of the United States delegation in the message which Mr. Foster read to us at our first meeting (ENDC/150).

There is no need for me, in this assembly of all places, to dwell on the dangers that will threaten us if we do not reach a non-dissemination agreement in the very near future. In a most important article which he published recently the United States representative, Mr. Foster, suggested that the time left to us might be measured in months rather than in years. I recall vividly the words of that great President of his country, John Kennedy, who said that in a world of many nuclear Powers there would be no peace, no stability, and no prospect of disarmament. It might be well for us to ponder a moment on those last four words: "no prospect of disarmament".

In an attempt to stop the spread of nuclear weapons we are not dealing simply with one of the possible approaches to disarmament. If we fail in this, if we are forced into a world in which nuclear weapons are accepted as casually and readily as rifles and tanks are accepted now, we may find that every road leading to disarmament and a peaceful world is finally and irrevocably blocked. There is encouraging evidence that not only the United States but also the other great nuclear Power in the world, the Soviet Union, shares our deep concern about these dangers. Now is the time for us to act, and this Committee is the proper forum.

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The United Kingdom believes that the Committee should now start to consider an agreement which would bind the nuclear Powers not to transfer control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers, nor to assist non-nuclear Powers in making those weapons, and which would at the same time bind the non-nuclear Powers neither to manufacture nor to seek control of nuclear weapons. In this work the United Kingdom hopes to make positive proposals for solving the problems involved, and we look forward to contributions from other representatives around this table.

My Government has very well understood the feeling expressed by a number of delegations in New York that an agreement on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons might be helped by including in it a programme of related measures. In general the measures proposed, such as the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban and a beginning in the destruction of nuclear weapons, are in our view important requirements in their own right which we should like to see considered concurrently with a non-dissemination agreement. The earlier we can reach agreement on them, the better. But this seems to us to be primarily a question of timing. If they can be agreed at the same time as a non-dissemination agreement, that would be most desirable; but in our view the most urgent requirement of all is a non-dissemination agreement. The time for that is running out fast, and if we missed our opportunity we could well find ourselves reaching a point of no return. If agreement on related measures is delayed, I urge that that should not make us wait. We should be prepared to conclude a non-dissemination agreement on its own and for its own sake.

My opinion is the same on the problem of inspection. If we could quickly reach general agreement on a system of verification to support this agreement, well and good. But we may find it wiser to conclude a simple treaty now and so avoid the sort of difficulties we might otherwise encounter.

Another measure for which urgent consideration was called in resolution DC/225 was, as I have said, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. If agreement could be reached on this it would complement and strengthen a non-dissemination agreement. The United Kingdom believes that agreement is possible, and we should like to see the early start of constructive work in this Committee to that end. We believe that recent improvements in seismological techniques of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests should make it possible to provide for a

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smaller number of on-site inspections than we had earlier believed to be necessary. As my Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 6 July: "We are not tied to a particular figure" (Official Report, Vol. 715, No. 147, col. 1342). Given flexibility on both sides it should be possible to bridge the small remaining gap between the two sides. Our scientists still believe that some on-site inspection is necessary, but they are ready to be convinced that it is not.

Soviet scientists are able, we are told, to detect and identify all underground nuclear explosions without fail. If that is so, it seems to us, as to so many other delegations who spoke on this subject in New York, that the obviously sensible course is to allow Western and Soviet scientists to meet to produce an agreed technical assessment of current detection and identification capabilities. There is surely nothing to lose and everything to gain. I would wholeheartedly endorse what the United States representative, Mr. Foster, said at our meeting two days ago:

"The United States, however, continues to be willing to explore what would constitute an adequate verification system in the light of recent and prospective developments in our capabilities. If such exploration indicates that verification requirements can be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections than were previously proposed, we will take those facts into account. We invite other countries to submit any data or research results which may be helpful to this end." (ENDC/PV.218, page 14).

It is only the Soviet Government which so far still refuses to allow such expert discussions, and we very much hope that it will yield to the pressure of international opinion on this issue.

I must now mention one section of resolution DC/225 about which, as members of the Committee will be aware, Her Majesty's Government have felt the need to sound a note of caution. Operative paragraph 2(d) of that resolution served perhaps as a useful reminder that agreement on disarmament should, by allowing reductions in military expenditure, release substantial resources for investment in other constructive fields. This, indeed, is one of the main arguments for a disarmament agreement. But the specialized agencies are already studying the possible issues such savings could raise, and there seems little point in this Committee straying from its own very important tasks to duplicate their work.

At the same time we must be frank enough to say that it seems to us altogether premature and even possibly counter-productive for those States which are in need of

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assistance in their development to seek to establish a fixed relationship between savings from disarmament and such assistance.

In the allocation of economic resources, as in the general field of disarmament and arms control, the question of balance is of prime importance. I need scarcely add that we have not taken this stand in an attempt to avoid an obligation. As my colleague, Sir Harold Beeley, reminded the 102nd meeting of the Disarmament Commission (DC/PV.102/Rev.2, pages 36-37), the annual expenditure of the United Kingdom on overseas aid has been at a high level for a long time and has risen consistently and substantially in recent years, and this has been at a time when the burden of our defence expenditure has also been rising. We must, too, take account of our internal economic situation. If we can improve our national rate of growth, we not only benefit ourselves but also improve our opportunities for capacity for continued and increasing overseas aid. Those two considerations are not mutually inimical; they are complementary.

So far I have been discussing the renewed mandate we received from the full membership of the United Nations meeting in the Disarmament Commission. I should now like to refer more specifically to the speeches we have heard by our two co-Chairmen in this Committee.

The opening address of the Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, two days ago seemed to put the accent on what he thinks has not been achieved. He spoke of the failure to achieve any concrete agreement either in general and complete disarmament or in the reduction of international tension. He recalled an as yet unfulfilled understanding that the Moscow partial test-ban treaty should be developed by other agreements. His survey, although it seemed to me to be over-pessimistic, is not one from which I would feel it necessary to dissent in all respects. However, he went on to say that: "The Committee has before it more than enough proposals on that score." (ENDC/PV.218, page 8) How are we to interpret that? Perhaps I had better leave Mr. Tsarapkin to explain it himself.

But surely it is not the number of proposals that need concern us unduly. We are here, after all, to explore any proposals that members of this Committee may wish to put. The period of gestation of any proposal does not necessarily determine its worth. Whether the proposal is old or whether it is brand-new, we should all be prepared to consider it on its merits.

I am bound to say that I found very much more encouragement in the speech of our

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United States colleague, Mr. Foster. We welcome the message he read us from President Johnson and the flexible and forward-looking approach which it is clear we can expect from the United States in our forthcoming discussions. I am happy to welcome the reiteration by Mr. Foster of the United States proposal for the transfer of substantial quantities of fissile material from nuclear weapons to peaceful uses under appropriate verification arrangements. If agreement can be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union in this sense, it would constitute a very important step towards the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The point I should like to emphasize is that this proposal involves the transfer to peaceful uses of a considerable quantity of fissile material. It therefore involves demonstrable and substantial disarmament, and anything that helps to take us in the direction of general and complete disarmament deserves the most careful consideration.

In this context I should like to recall that two years ago Her Majesty's Government announced the end of the production in the United Kingdom of uranium-235 for military purposes. We have carried out that undertaking. At the same time we started to bring our production of military plutonium to an end. That, too, I suggest, was a step in the right direction.

I trust I reflect the opinion of every delegation here when I say that we all hope for positive further results from this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; but I hope that I shall not be thought presumptuous if, in my first speech before this Committee, I suggest the need for a greatly-increased tempo and intensity in our deliberations here. I know that there are difficulties of staff. I know, too, that it is hard for people not engaged in these negotiations to appreciate the great volume of hard work that has been done in the past by the delegations and the Secretariat at meetings of this Committee. However, I am bound to say that to the great majority of people -- and it is with the great majority of people that we are, after all, concerned -- our pattern of two plenary meetings a week has, unjustifiably or not, an air of leisure that seems out of place and at odds with the great urgency of the problems we are here to discuss. I hope that in due course we shall find it possible to increase the number of plenary meetings.

There is, I suggest, another course open to us which we have not yet explored but which might well be fruitful. We have talked about it on numerous occasions before, so it is not a new idea; we use it regularly and without question in other forums, so it is not an unfamiliar approach. It is that of supplementing our

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regular meetings by ad hoc informal working and technical groups. Nearly all delegations here have endorsed the idea at one stage or another, in one form or another, and most have done so repeatedly.

The status and description of these get-togethers -- whether groups, parties or what you will -- is secondary to the requirement that they should be informal and that they should be well-informed. At the Disarmament Commission in New York the representative of Brazil expressed the view that:

"Without the necessary technical assistance, the Eighteen-Nation Committee may be doomed to slow progress and periodic recesses. The setting up of technical groups will serve the purpose of receiving, digesting and transmitting in an objective and pragmatic form the essentials of all material capable of clarifying the intricacies of disarmament, as well as those doubts of a technical nature that will inevitably emerge in the course of the negotiations." (DC/PV.79, page 11).

I do not think that more technical discussion of the problems confronting us in the fields of general and complete disarmament and of collateral measures will mean that we shall get lost in a maze of technical detail. It might indeed serve to clarify the area in which agreement is technically possible and thus make it easier to take the important decisions of principle. I cannot see why we should not try to move from the particular to the general on topics which the Committee initially believes worth exploring. As I suggested earlier, informal scientific discussion on the criteria for a comprehensive test ban could surely be nothing but helpful. As Mr. Macmillan, when Prime Minister, said in the General Assembly in September 1960, talking of the genesis of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests:

"It was the agreement of the scientists that was the first step. I would venture to submit that there is a lesson to be learned here." (A/PV.877, para.133).

I suggest too that there is also a strong case for instituting some form of working group to which the problems about the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicle systems could be referred back. Nuclear delivery vehicle systems offer one of the keys to real progress in general and complete disarmament, but it is a subject which requires expert analysis; it is not merely a matter of numbers or types but of other factors, such as those of yield and accuracy. These are proper subjects for technical examination by a working group, and we in the United Kingdom would be happy to submit the results of our studies for consideration by such a group.

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I must point out that we have never suggested delegating decisions of principle to experts or scientists; what we have suggested --- and I suggest it again now -- is that we in this Committee should seek the benefit of their advice on matters on which there may be technical uncertainty or divergence on the relevant facts. Political decision must rest, as always, with the Committee.

I look forward to Mr. Tsarapkin's speech when he comes, as he surely must, to deal with the problem of non-dissemination. I hope he will not be content to rehearse once more all that he has said in the past about his country's objections to the creation of an Atlantic Nuclear Force. For my part I can only say that his misgivings are needless. My Government has repeatedly stated its adamant opposition to putting any new fingers on the nuclear trigger. I will not now reiterate the control and veto provisions contemplated under the ANF proposals. I can only point out that, if it were not our profound conviction that such an arrangement did not constitute the spread of nuclear weapons control, we would not entertain it. Nor, obviously, would we actively pursue an agreement on non-dissemination if the two were in conflict.

Finally, may I, on behalf of my delegation, my Government and myself, express the hope that we shall not use any of the precious time of this Committee in futile propaganda? The task before us -- and it is an urgent and vital task -- concerns disarmament. What is going on in South-East Asia or in Berlin is, of course, relevant. But we shall be neglecting our real responsibilities if we engage here in endless charge and countercharge. Let us accept that there are issues, vital and painful issues, about which we profoundly disagree. But let us leave those that do not relate immediately to disarmament to other, more appropriate channels of diplomacy.

What we must do here is look at each other's proposals calmly, seriously and objectively. We must reject the sterile habit of assuming that a plan has some sinister underlying motive for no better reason than that it has been proposed by someone else. And, as I suggested earlier, if some of the proposals have a familiar air, that should not disqualify them from a fresh and serious examination. After all, there can be nothing much new or dramatic in the field of disarmament proposals. But what is new and desperately serious is the climate in which we meet here. We are at a parting of the ways. If we choose the road that leads to a world of nuclear anarchy, we shall bequeath a terrible legacy to our children -- one for which, if

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they survive it, they will reproach us bitterly. If we choose the other road, we still have a chance to fashion a world in which decency will prevail, and peace, and the rule of law. I think it is not too extreme to suggest with all seriousness that this assembly here this summer in Geneva may be our last chance. I hope that we shall not let it pass.

Mr. FANFANI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian Government, being convinced of the need to carry on disarmament negotiations all the time and without remission, has taken an active interest in the resumption of this Conference, which is today holding the second meeting of its eighth session.

In this connexion the Italian Government approached on 23 March last the two co-Chairmen of this Committee, and throughout the work of the United Nations Commission in New York the Italian delegation, headed by Mr. Cavalletti, endeavoured to win acceptance for the arguments in favour of continuing the disarmament negotiations as a matter of urgency. I mention the steps we have taken, not in order to emphasize the Italian Government's action— which in any case falls within the framework of the policy we have always pursued— but in order to show more clearly the feelings of lively and sincere satisfaction with which the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is attending this meeting today.

The resumption of these negotiations is a positive and important fact, and I wish to convey personally to this Committee the good wishes and encouragement of the Italian Government in order to stress once again, particularly at this time, the importance which Italy attaches to the cause of disarmament and the interest which she takes in it.

It would be hard to deny that at the present time there are dangerous hotbeds of tension in the world. These differences might have caused interest in disarmament to slacken. The contrary proved to be the case, and thus the resumption of the Geneva Conference in July 1965 acquires a particular political and psychological value. This resumption confirms that the general yearning for peace remains strong and active and that the will of the governments to respond to it by seeking patiently and arduously for rapprochements and agreements remains real and valid. The fact that this will prevails over the hotbeds of crisis and the negative factors has an importance which will certainly not escape the notice of anyone.

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Conflicts, wherever they arise, are essentially the heaviest fruits of mistrust. They are the last fruits of misunderstanding and suspicion. This rule holds good even at the present political juncture. The reconvening of this Conference at this time of ominous concern opens up possibilities of diminishing mutual distrust and promoting agreement. By the contacts it establishes, by the results at which it aims, this Conference can influence, even more than in the past, the development of the general situation, and can even bring about the indispensable conditions for a negotiated solution of the problem of Viet-Nam within the United Nations, in accordance with the suggestion of President Johnson which we heard yesterday (ENDC/150).

What is happening in South-East Asia and is causing everyone so much concern will not remain unaffected by the positive influence of the work of the Geneva Committee. Progress in the work at Geneva, and even the strength and depth of the contacts here can have very wide repercussions on the development of the conflict in Viet-Nam. That must never be forgotten.

Let us remember the wide and favourable repercussions of the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). There is no doubt that if in the course of this session the Conference could conclude some agreements, bring about some important rapprochements or even dispel some suspicions, a wave of hope would arise in the world, with psychological encouragements and practical effects which would certainly go a long way - even beyond the scope of the agreements achieved.

The Geneva Committee has a powerful lever with which to restore the necessary conditions for a constructive dialogue between peoples, States and governments which are genuinely interested in world peace. It is incumbent on all representatives to act in such a way that this lever may be effective and produce the hoped-for effects in the field of military disarmament and in that of psychological and political disarmament. None of the "Eighteen" should forget for a single day the connexion between the work and meetings in Geneva and gradual progress towards a negotiated solution in order to resolve, with full respect for general justice, the freedom of the peoples, the political equilibrium of South-East Asia and world security, the conflict which is unfortunately being ever more intensified in Viet-Nam.

I am well aware of the special task of the Committee. As in the past, it is certainly a very difficult one. But its accomplishment will be facilitated by the recent discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The work of that Commission

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has had positive results. The will of all countries to make progress on the road to disarmament has been confirmed and strengthened as a result. The final resolution (DC/225; ENDC/149), which was adopted with a very large majority and without any opposition, indicates clearly to this Committee the path to be followed. It is on that basis that the Committee will have to resume, I think, the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament which would be an act of faith in a better world and an instrument for bringing it about.

It is well known that the Committee was faced during its last session with certain difficulties regarding the reduction of nuclear vehicles. The Italian delegation believes, and has always believed, that it will be possible to find for this essential question a compromise formula in keeping with the fundamental principles of disarmament.

Perhaps it will also be possible to deal with other matters. For example, it will not be long before the questions of peace-keeping machinery and of international security forces are thoroughly examined here. Although these questions appear at first sight to be rather like a crowning of the work of disarmament, the bringing closer together of ideas, brought about beforehand in this field, could render more easy the solution of certain more urgent problems. Indeed, it might be possible to find in agreed formulas of collective security some sort of reinsurance against the inevitable risks in any disarmament process.

But in order to prepare for general and complete disarmament the United Nations resolution recommends to us immediate and extremely urgent objectives: the banning of nuclear tests, and an agreement on non-dissemination. The two problems are, moreover, closely linked, because the conclusion of a treaty for a general ban on tests would make the conclusion of an agreement on non-dissemination much easier.

With regard to tests, a review of the technical situation is certainly necessary. We know already that this work now appears in a different light and that it could at the present time open up concrete prospects of agreement. It seems that on both sides—at least of the nuclear countries represented here--there is a political will to come to terms. But in order to be embodied in an agreement, this will requires beforehand the assurance of certain technical safeguards. In this regard it must not be forgotten that we can count on the co-operation of the non-aligned countries, which are ready to offer their territories and the help of their own personnel to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement, and they are willing to do so.

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The other problem the extreme urgency of which has been stressed by the United Nations is that of an agreement on non-dissemination. Those discussions have also indicated the difficulties which unfortunately await us, difficulties which, while they are not slight, ought not to be insurmountable. One of those obstacles is already well known. It is the Soviet objection to a possible Western nuclear collaboration which, while aimed at improving European security, would limit-- as has been said many times-- the danger of a future dissemination of nuclear weapons. Another kind of difficulty appeared for the first time during the recent discussions at the United Nations: some non-nuclear countries hesitate to renounce these weapons for ever without having certain safeguards against nuclear attack, and without some progress in the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear countries themselves.

Obviously, all these objections pose problems which cannot be ignored. In this regard, several solutions were considered during the discussions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, such as: the establishment by the nuclear countries of the safeguards requested by the others; commitment by the nuclear countries to a certain programme of nuclear disarmament; the fixing of conditions or the inclusion of appropriate withdrawal clauses. These ideas deserve thorough consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee with a view to finding a formula acceptable to all as soon as possible. This Committee has just heard on this subject a very important statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, who has put forward some very constructive ideas on these problems. I am sure that the Committee appreciates the valuable contribution which the United Kingdom delegation has just made to our task.

It has been rightly said that this Committee has the task of preparing a draft treaty during this session in order to submit it in due course to the United Nations Disarmament Commission for discussion and advice at its next session. But if it should not be possible to prepare within a reasonable time such a draft comprising obligations for both the nuclear and the non-nuclear countries, the Italian delegation would reserve the right to appeal to the non-nuclear countries to take an initiative which, without prejudice to their own points of view, would fix a certain period for a moratorium on the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being

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understood of course that if their aforementioned demands were not complied with during that time-limit, they would resume their freedom of action.

In that way a respite would be given to the anxiety about nuclear dissemination and, moreover, a factor of pressure and persuasion would be created which could be brought to bear on the nuclear countries in order to spur them to conclude a general agreement, thus speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament. Thus a message of peace and good will could be given to the world, a message to which no one--it is to be hoped-- could remain insensible. But we still hope that a comprehensive agreement including limitations for all nuclear and non-nuclear countries will be possible, and the Italian delegation will do its best to contribute to achieving it.

In concluding my statement on the future work of the Committee, I cannot fail to mention the appeal made by the United Nations Commission (DC/225; ENDC/149) concerning the use of the savings that could be made as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures. This argument was put forward a few moments ago by the representative of the United Kingdom.

The Disarmament Commission, acting on the initiative of the Italian delegation and other delegations, adopted in substance and re-affirmed the idea underlying the message from Bombay in December 1964 in favour of humane and brotherly mutual assistance between all the peoples of the world. The Commission re-affirmed in particular the principle that a substantial part of the resources made available through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social progress of the developing countries, and has recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should in its work consider the allocation of these resources to programmes of co-operation and mutual assistance.

I think that this Committee will have no difficulty in complying with this recommendation without departing from its essential task, that of negotiating and concluding agreements on disarmament. The constant awareness which we should always retain of the economic implications of disarmament measures decided upon here with one accord, and the possible use of those savings for the benefit of the developing countries, will be further incentives to encourage and stimulate us in our work.

The questions on the agenda of this Committee (ENDC/52) have already been studied at length here, so much so that some of them might now be ripe for rapid solution. The Italian delegations thinks that it should consequently be possible to conclude some concrete agreements during the present session. In any case, allow me

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to express my utmost confidence that what is called the Geneva spirit will prevail effectively in your discussions. I express the hope that they will be inspired by a constructive spirit of mutual understanding. The reaffirmation of these sentiments, over and above the general difficulties of the moment, will be a fact of very great value, giving the lie to pessimism and ill omens, and corresponding with the hopes and aspirations of all peoples in regard to the peace and security of the world in general and of some areas in particular, for the tranquillity and freedom of which there is so much concern among us all.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 219th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ahmed Osman, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 3 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.